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An intertemporal  capital asset  valuation approach is applied to 
analyzing the effects of nonlinear taxes on  asset values and optimal 
investment decisions.  The method is quite general, and is illustrated 
both analytically and numerically,  The paper studies the effects of 
nonlinearities in the corporate income  tax,  including the percentage 
depletion  allowance, on mine values and investment  decisions.  Although 
the tax policies are  found  to have the expected effects on asset values, 
the effects on investment  decisions are sometimes perverse.  An increase 
in the  income  tax rate may encourage investment;  an increase in the dep- 
letion  allowance subsidy may discourage investment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is generally known that nonlinearities, asymmetries,  and nondifferentiable kinks can 
play a substantial and oft-times perverse role in determining  the effects of tax policies on 
behavior.  The typical treatment in the literature,  however, is to treat policies as symmetric 
and linear.  Nonlinearities sometimes turn interesting questions into intractable problems; 
but nonlinear effects should not always be ignored. 
The combination  of nonhinearities in the corporate tax system and significant uncer- 
tainty make it difficult to model the impact of tax policies on the value of a firm's  assets 
and its investment  decisions.  Recently, Gordon [1985], Bulow and Summers  [1984], Gor- 
don and Wilson  1986]  and others have investigated the efficiency costs from taxing risky 
assets.  Their papers have been primarily concerned with a simple tax on capital income. 
We emphasize, instead, the effects of  some of the actual complexities of corporate  taxation, 
such as  asymmetric loss treatment and revenue subsidies. 
In this paper we treat asset valuation and investment  decisions by mining  firms, al- 
though the methods employed are generally applicable to a wide range of problems  faced by 
economic agents.  The existence of special, nonlinear, tax provisions applicable to mining 
operations  and an unusually  high  degree of price  uncertainty  suggest that if the interactions 
between  nonlinear  taxes and uncertainty are important, mining should be an especially 
interesting  case.1 
Thie is a subtantia1ly  revised version of Chapter  1 from my dissertation.  I would like 
to thank Jerry Hausman, Diderik Lund, Bruce Meyer,  Bob Pindyck, Jim Pterba, and  two  anonymous 
refereee for helpful discussion and Buggestions.  Financial support was received  from the National Science 
Foundation and the Alfred P.  Sloan Foundation. 
1  In the conclu,ion to the paper we briefly review other papers which specifically  treat the valuation 
of mining resources under uncertainty.  The emphasis of this paper on the interaction between nonlinear 
taxes and uncertainty does not appear  in the existing natural resource literature, 
1 When  cash flows from  an  asset  are nonlinear  in random variables,  we know from 
Jensen's Inequality that standard discounted expected cash flows will not correctly mea- 
sure asset value.  We apply a general equilibrium model of intertemporal  asset valuation 
to determine equilibrium  mine values, and to evaluate  optimal investment  policy, under 
different tax regimes.  With restrictive assumptions, the method yields analytical results 
which provide insight  into some of the complicated interactions  between nonlinear taxes 
and uncertainty.  We then present  numerical results for a more  general problem which 
captures several operating characteristics of a mining venture. 
In the course of  demonstrating a feasible method for analyzing the effects  of  some 
nonlinear taxes on asset valuation and risky investment  decisions, we present some new 
results on tax policy effects. For example, although  the value of a mine is decreasing in the 
rate of corporate income taxation, an increase in the tax rate may  encourage investment. 
Investment can be encouraged  because of the nonlinearity of tax liabilities in stochastic 
output price.  Firms may delay investment in mines in anticipation  of  higher future prices. 
Increasing  the corporate tax rate increases tax liability more when prices are high than 
when they are low, reducing  the speculative value of delaying investment. 
We also analyze the effects of the percentage depletion  allowance (PDA). The depletion 
allowance is an unambiguous  subsidy  to the value of mining  assets.  Nonetheless, while 
increasing quasi-rents, the PDA subsidy can in fact  discourage investment in some mining 
projects. Increasing  the PDA lowers  the marginal tax rate when prices are high, without 
changing the tax rate when prices are low. Thus, an increase in the PDA may increase the 
expected value of future production  sufficiently for firms to delay investments in current 
production. Further, the depletion  allowance may also increase the probability  that firms 
will shut down marginal existing projects.  Again,  a higher allowance rate provides  an 
incentive for the firm to bear the costs of waiting to produce, against the possibility that 
price will rise and that the subsidy will be larger. 
In Section 2  of the paper we briefly describe the types of taxes  that are applied  to 
mining ventures, with emphasis  on nonlinearities  in the corporate income  tax and the 
percentage depletion allowance.  This section motivates the need for more sophisticated 
valuation techniques than are typically employed.  We develop the analytical method in 
2 Section 3. The method is essentially an application of an intertemporal  general equilibrium 
asset pricing model.  Placing  the analysis in a continuous-time setting generates feasible 
statements of the asset valuation and optimal investment problems.  We investigate  some 
of  the effects of taxes  on L:set value in this section.  Then, in Section 4,  we consider 
the effects of taxes on the optimal investment  decision. We also implement a numerical 
solution to a fairly general valuation problem, which captures many aspects of a realistic 
mining venture.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
TAXATION  AND MINiNG FIRMS 
Overview of Taxes on Mining Firms 
Mining operations  have typically  attracted a large and specialized aet of tax policies. 
Much of the literature on exhaustible  resources has considered the effects of  different taxes 
on mining output and prices, usually  in the context of a Hotelling  [1931]  model with no 
uncertainty or new  investment.2  More recently, some authors have begun to investigate 
taxes on mining under  uncertainty, and with new investment.  These studies have depended 
primarily on Monte Carlo-type  simulations,  with a focus on finding the "best" tax policy 
from a given set, according to some criterion.3 
Among the many tax provisions applicable to mining firms is the usual corporate in- 
come tax with its  provisions for depreciation  of tangible capital assets.  However, much 
of the value of mining assets is treated differently than it would be under the standard 
depreciation  rules. Most of the costs of exploring for and developing new mining deposits 
are labelled as  "intangible"  costs, and are expensible under the U.S. corporate tax code. 
The primary asset — the mineral reserves themselves — have traditionally been called a 
"depletable"  asset, and firms take a "depletion" deduction, based on gross revenues, rather 
than a cost-based  depreciation  deduction.4 
Other taxes on mining ventures include bonus and royalty payments, usually for lease 
rights on nationalized resources; severance or output taxes; property taxes; and, various 
2  See  e.g.  Burness [1976], and for a survey, Dasgupta and Heal  [1979]. 
See,  e.gc  Gamponia and Mendelsohn [1985] and Virmani [1986]. 
It has long been recognized that depletion allowance ruln in the U.S. have little to do with the decline 
in the economic value of the resource.  Further, since the capital gain in Srrn value when a deposit is 
discovered is not taxed  the depletion deduction is generally  recognised  as a policy-motivated subsidy. 
3 sorts of rent taxes which are intended to tax the rents to mineral resource ownership, 
without distorting the firm's operating and investment  decisions.5 
We focus on the corporate income tax with a percentage depletion allowance  in this 
paper.  To simplify the analysis, we assume that all nondepletable  assets are treated as 
intangibles, and thus are expensed rather than depreciated. For new, risky projects,  much 
of the investment  is for exploration  and development,  so this latter assumption is not 
entirely unrealistic. 
Income taxes on net losses are not refundable,  and at best  can be carried into other 
years to offset postive taxable income in those years.  As will be shown below, the PDA 
creates yet another nonlinearity in tax liabilities. The effect of these nonlinearities  can be 
surprising.  We will show that an increase in the income tax rate may actually encourage 
a firm to undertake an investment, even though the value of the project is decreased. 
The percentage  depletion allowance (PDA) has long been controversial, while account- 
ing for a fairly large reduction in tax receipts. The Treasury  Department  recently estimated 
that repealing the FDA for independent  oil and gas producers would save the government 
$1.4 billion in 1986, and a total of $12 billion through 1990 (Clark  [1985]).6  Since it has 
been recognized that the PDA is a subsidy, its proponents  have argued that is a desirable 
mechanism for compensating firms for the riskiness of mining, and for providing  incentives 
for investing  is  these enterprises.7Although  the FDA is likely to encourage investment  in 
many cases, investments  in some situations will be discouraged.  The FDA also distorts 
operating decisions on existing projects.  For instance, the PDA may  lead firms to shut 
down projects earlier than would otherwise be optimal. 
The Representative Project 
We take the viewpoint of an individual  mining firm making incremental investment 
decisions under uncertainty. We suppose that there is a known quantity of reserves at a 
particular site, and the firm owns the right to develop the mine and extract the reserves. 
&  Garnaut and Clunies-Rose [1975] present a theoretical treatment  of a rent tax; see,  e.g., Gamponia 
and Mendelsohn [198$] for the distortions that feaeible rent taxes are likely to introduce. 
6  Percentage depletion has not  been available to the major" oil and gas producers since 1975.  Percentage 
depletion is still available to all producers in moet hard-rock mining industries. 
Oil and gas industry  lobbyists argued during the recent tax  reform  debates that the PDA and expensing 
of intangibles are two of the moet important incentives for  outside sources to inveet in drilling projects. 
See Glen [1985] and Clark [1985]. 
4 The firm is uncertain about the future evolution of prices, with that uncertainty  increasing 
as the length of the forecast increases.8  We place no restrictions  on preferences other than 
that investors have time-additive,  risk-averse expected utility functions. 
The firm can develop thE mine at a known and fixed investment  cost, I.  Production 
technology  is such  that the firm can produce any amount of output per year up to a 
capacity constraint, .  The firm can shut down the mine temporarily,  and reopen later if 
conditions  warrant, although in general closing and opening will have a fixed cost.  The 
firm can also abandon a mine.  (More general technologies and operating policies can also 
be valued by the methods presented.) 
Price is exogenous but stochastic; its dynamics are described  by 
dp=cspdt+cpdz  (1) 
where z is a standard Wiener process with unit variance  and zero mean; i.e., p(t)  follows 
an Ito process.9 Today's spot price is known,  but uncertainty  increases the further out the 
firm forecasts;  the variance of p(s) is u2p2(s 
— t).1° The firm plans to sell its output on 
the spot market. 
For simplicity, we assume that unit production  costs are known and constant, c. Intro- 
ducing uncertainty or curvature to the cost function is straightforward.'1 
We will specify the details of the tax code in Section 3; for now we refer to net annual 
tax liabilities  as  TAX. The annual cash flows from an existing mine are 
(p—c)q—F— TAX  (2) 
where F represents any fixed costs incurred during the period. 
In an earlier version of this paper Macifie-Mason ]1954a],  geological uncertainty  was incorporated 
in two  ways: first  by assuming that there is uncertainty about the total  amount of reserves to be 
discovered; and eecond, by assuming that the unit production cost was uncertain and changing over 
time.  Although some interesting results on the role of geological  uncertainty emerged, the qualitative 
implicatione for investment decisions were unchanged. 
For an introduction  to the mathematics of lbS processes,  see Merton [1981]. 
10  We are  ignoring the  general  equilibrium effects of the PDA by specifying prices exogenously. It is 
worth noting however, that equation (1) is consistent with the simple Hotelling rule for exhaustible 
resource industry  equilibrium: set a = 0 and a = r (the rate of interest),  and prices will grow with 
certainty at the rate of interest. 
See MacKie-Mason ]1984a] for cost uncertainty. 
S It will be an object of Section  3  to determine the value of  a mining  project.  It  is 
clear that we cannot simply take the expected discounted  value of cash  flows as the asset's 
value.  First, since the TAX function is nonlinear, and price is stochastic,  the expected 
value is difficult to calculate; by Jensen's  Inequality, the expected value of the function  is 
not simply equal to the TAX function applied to the expected value of price and the other 
parameters. 
More  importantly,  we allow investors to have general,  risk-averse preferences.  The 
appropriate discount rate will not  in general be the risk-free rate of interest. As  is  well- 
known, there may not even be a well-defined risk-adjusted  rate of discount; each stochastic 
component  of cash flow must be discounted according to its own risk characteristics.  Fur- 
ther, since the firm can  take operating decisions which may  affect  the riskiness of cash 
flows (adjustments in the output rate; shutdown and re-opening), the appropriate rates of 
discount will in general be endogenous. 
Thus, we simply  state that the value of an existing mine  is  M(x, t; ti), where x is 
a vector of stochastic  state variables,  is a vector representing  the operating options 
available to the firm (e.g., shutdown, rate of output, etc.), and t represents  calendar  time 
A  value-maximizing  firm will  have to solve a stochastic dynamic programming  problem 
to chose the operating, or control  variables i  to maximize  the  value of the existing mine. 
Then, when  considering the value of the ("lease") right to invest in and develop a new 
mine, we will represent  that value as L(M, I, t) The value of the right to develop a mine 
depends on the value of a developed mine, the investment  cost, and calendar time.  The 
optimal investment  decision, then, is to choose when to make the investment, I, so as to 
maximize the value of the ownership, or lease right, L. 
The next section of the paper will present a method for determining  the values M 
and L in a dynamic capital market equilibrium.  We will then use the resulting valuation 
functions to investigate  the effects of tax policies on asset value and investment  decisions. 
VALUING RISKY MINrNG ASSETS 
An Interternporal  CAPM and the  Value of Risky Assets 
Suppose  the firm wishes to value an asset which depends on an (a x  1)  vector of st 
variables, x, and a control  policy functional,  b  'I', 'P a compact space.  (The asset can 
6 be, for instance, an existing mine, or a lease right to develop a new mine.)  We assume 
that the state variables are generated  by a joint Ito diffusion process, 
dx = a(x,t,b)dt + E(x,)dz  (3) 
where a is an (n x 1)  vector-valued  function,  and E an (n x n) matrix-valued  function. 
The instantaneous expectation and covariance of the x1  are given by E(dx) =  (x, ) 
and Cov(dx,dx) = a12 (x,sb), respectively. 
Define the value of the asset to the firm at time t  as V(x, t, ). A firm's shareholders 
and/or managers  may  have concave preferences over income lotteries, so the risk charac- 
teristics of the project may  affect its value to the firm.  As a result the correct rate of 
discount is endogenous  and will depend on project characteristics,  investor and manager 
preferences,  and the firm's optimal control decisions. Thus, we cannot directly specify the 
value function, V(.). Rather, we use capital market conditions to determine what the value 
of the project must be in equilibrium. 
We need an intertemporal capital  asset pricing model which yields equilibrium  in as- 
set markets with taxes on corporate  cash flows,  If we make  the assumptions  of Merton 
[1973b[—essentially those of perfect markets, homogeneous expectations  and time-additive 
von Neumann-Morgenstern  investor preferences—then it is possible to generalize Merton's 
result so that in equilibrium,  security returns must satisfy the relationship 
— r = .\aM/aM  (4) 
where ,  is the instantaneous expected after-tax  rate of return on security 1; r is the risk- 
free interest rate; o  and a1M are the instantaneous covariance of the market portfolio 
with  itself and with security i,  respectively; and A  (Lm — r)/aM.'2  By adding  an 
assumption  of free entry and exit, Constantinides [19781  points out that equation  (4) must 
also hold for investment projects  viewed as assets. 
12  Equation (4) is just a statement for asset markets of the fundamental principle of no excess returns 
in competitive equilibrium, which must  hold in an intertemporal setting as well as in a static model. 
The results states that in equilibrium, an asset muet earn a return equal to the risk-free rate plus a 
premium for systematic risk. 
7 Following Constantinides  [1978], we can now derive a partial differential equation, the 
solution of which yields the value of the project.  Defining 11AT (x,t;t,b)  as the after-tax 
instantaneous rate of cash flow from the asset, given control policy ,  we can show that 
V (x, ,,  t) must  solve (subscripts  on V indicate differentiation) 
— rV + Vt +L(n 
— APMCi) V + 
tEauVia} 
= 0  (5) 
t=1  i=lj=1 
subject to appropriate  boundary conditions, where PiM  is the instantaneous correlation 
coefficient between dz and the market return. 
Equation (5) is the fundamental  valuation  result. Assuming the existence of a unique 
maximizing control policy Y, the value of the project can be determined from (5) and the 
boundary conditions.  Parabolic partial differential equations of this sort  are often solved 
numerically in finance applications; for a survey of methods,  see, e.g., Geske and Shsstri 
[1985]  and Brennan and Schwartz  ]1978[.  For some simple problems,  the solution to  (5) 
can he obtained analytically;  this will be the case for some of the examples considered 
below. 
Another  way of  looking at the  valuation equation leads to a second solution approach, 
and suggests the intuition for the valuation method.  Suppose a firm  whose managers 
and investors are risk-neutral  wishes to value an asset. Let the drift vector and variance- 
covariance matrix for a stochastic vector * be &  and E.  A  risk-neutral  firm values the 
project by its discounted cash flows 
i'(*,t; )  = maxEe  J0°° HAT(*, &, u)edu 
where Ee is the expectation  operator conditional on all information known at time t = 0. 
From the theory of stochastic optimal control, we can show that V must satisfy 
max{I1AT 
- r  +9 + E&i7 +  = 0 
i=1  i=1j=1 
subject to the appropriate boundary conditions.  Constantinides  [1978] noted that if we 
redefine  the state  equation, (3),  by replacing a with &  —  then the two 
8 valuation equations, (5)  and (7),  are identical.  (It is  straightforward  to show that the 
boundary  conditions  in the two problems are identical.)  Thus, capital market equilibrium 
requires that the firm value a project as if preferences were risk-neutral,  subject to replacing 
the drift vector  a with is. 
This approach  makes clear that the valuation  method has the effect of requiring that 
each stochastic  component of cash  flow  be discounted at a rate  (possibly endogenous) 
appropriate to its riskiness.  The method can be viewed as "correct"  way of calculating 
a risk-adjusted  discounted  present value, where each stochastic  component  gets  its own 
risk-adjusted  discount rate.  Since the problem can be reduced to an expected discounted 
cash flow calculation, an alternative solution approach to solving the partial differential 
equation in (5) is to evaluate (6) analytically or by Monte Carlo methods. In Section 4 we 
shall discuss instances in which the Monte Carlo approach has advantages over the more 
direct solution. 
We now have two straightforward  routes for finding project value: solve equation (5), 
or  replace a with is and solve equation (6).  Neither requires us to substantially restrict 
the firm's treatment of risk.  The method  is analytically tractable in simple problems, 
and is well-suited  to numerical methods  of analysis when more realism is desired.  In the 
remainder  of the paper, we will apply the valuation method to analyses  of the effects of 
nonlinear tax policies on risky mining assets and investment  decisions. 
Statement of Tax Rules and Operating Options 
We assume that the mine produces at a fixed rate of  per year. Further, once oper- 
ating, the mine remains open and in operation  until  the reserves are exhausted. These 
simplifications allow us to obtain analytical results, which permit an intuitive understand- 
ing of the interaction between nonlinear taxes and uncertainty. (Section 4 introduces  a 
more flexible operating  policy.)  We also assume that the quantity of reserves available for 
extraction from the mine is fixed and known at the date of evaluation.'3 
We will consider  two different rules for corporate  taxation. The first allows for full loss 
refunds; i.e., if the firm has a taxable  loss in a period, the government refunds the negative 
tax liability.  The second rule, at the other extreme,  allows  for no loss refunds:  the firm  '  See MacKie-Mason [1984a] for various treatmerite of geological  uncertainty. 
9 never collects negative taxes.  The actual U.S. rules fall somewhere in-between,  allowing 
firms to carry losses backwards as offsets to positive taxable income during the previous 
three years (leading to downward revisioas of pa.st tax liabilities, and tax refunds), or to 
carry losses forward  to offset future positive taxable income for up to 15 years.'4 
We assume that all capital expenditures  on the mine are either expensible  as "intan- 
gibles" or are treated as depletable, and subject to the PDA rules.  Setting the rate of the 
depletion allowance to zero for a moment,  the tax liabilities  under the full-refunds  and 
no-refunds  rules are then: 
TAX = r(p 
— c)j 
TAXN =rmax[p—c,04 
where (F, N) indicate "full refunds"  and "no refunds", respectively.  (We have suppressed 
fixed costs for simplicity.) 
The percentage  depletion  allowance rules essentially state that firms may deduct  1006 
percent of gross income from taxable income, subject to a limitation of 50 percent of net 
income.  However, since the PDA is an voluntary  deduction,  the firm does not have to 
subtract 50% of  a negative amount  if net income is negative.15  The firm's tax liability 
under the full-refunds rule is then 
TAXF  3' r(p  — c) 
— r  min[Ep,7, .5(p 
— c)4],  if p  c 
(8') 
1 r(p 
— c)q,  otherwise 
This can be conveniently simplified as 
14  For many firms, the csrryback provision means that they effectively  face a full refund rule; as long 
as their losses in a given year don't exceed the sum of positive taxable  income over the previous 
three years, they obtain immediate tax loss refunds.  Interactions with various tax credits and other 
provisions of the law complicate this somewhat; see Altshuler and Auerbach [1986].  For other firms, 
who carry large and persistent losses so that sufficient  positive income is not likely to he earned for 
many years, ths need to rely on carryforwards means that—after discounting—these firms effectively 
face something like  the no-refunds nile. Auerbach and Poterba  [1986] have found that once a firm 
enters a state of tax loss, persistence in that state ts quite high, and the marginal effective refund rate 
on tax losses can be  relatively low.  Other firms fall between these two  extremes. 
'a I am grateful to David R.omer for alerting me to this possibility. 
10 TAX = 
min{r(P 
— c)q,  .5r(p 
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The firm's  tax liability under the two different rules is illustrated in Figure 1  and in 
Figure 2.  (The horizontal  axis is measured in pre-tax net income,  but unit costs, c, and 
output, ,  are held constant, so only p is increasing.) Consider  Figure 1, in which the firm 
receives full loss refunds.  Without a PDA, the government taxes the constant fraction r of 
net income.  With a PDA, the government takes a lower base fraction, .5r, if net income is 
positive, but when the firm is fortunate (stochastic  price, a.nd hence net income, is high) 
the government takes an additional bite through its contingent claim (the max[., . term in 
(TAXF));  when net income is negative, the government still refunds  the fraction r.  The 
additional, contingent,  claim occurs when p > p,  where p" = (--) x c, from equation 
(TAXF'); that is, when p is sufficiently high that 1005 percent of gross revenue is less than 
50% of net income.  We refer to the difference between total tax take with a PDA and the 
part due to the linear income tax rate as "cream-skimming".  The marginal tax rate when 
there is no PDA is r; when there is a PDA, the marginal tax rate is r for negative  taxable 
income,  and .5r when  the taxable income is  low, but positive.  However, when the state 
of the world is good (the max[., . term is positive), the government  "skims the cream"  off 
the top with a higher marginal rate on net income of (1 
— 
To value the mine asset, we now follow  one of the two related methods outlined above. 
We can either substitute the period cash flows into the stochastic Bellman equation, (5), 
and directly solve this partial  differential equation,  or recognize that if we modify the 
stochastic  process describing the evolution of prices by replacing a with &, the solution to 
(5) is simply the expected  present value of the firm's period cash flows,  discounted at the 
16  Obviously  the depletion rate, 5  must be  lees than .5. 
11 TM 
Figure 2.  Tax Liabilities with No Loss Offsets 




Figure 1.  Tax Liabilities with Full Loss Offsets 
TAX 
Ps  Cp—c)q M(p, t) = Eo f  IIAT(p, t)e_tdt  (10) 
where the appropriate  cash-flow formulation  is used depending on the loss-refund rule, and 
with the stocahstic drift in p taken to be &. 
The nonlinearities due to the nondifferentiable max[., . and min[.,'] terms in the tax 
liabilities will cause difficulties when we try to evaluate the expected value of cash flows 
using  the valuation rule.  However, the same  assumptions  we adopted to develop  the 
valuation equation enable  us to derive  an everywhere differentiable, explicit function for 
the expected  present value of the various contingent tax liabilities. Let 
W(p,t, c) = Eoe'  max[p 
— c,01  (11) 
where Eo is the conditional  expectation operator at time zero over the distribution of p. 
W(p,t,c)  is  the market value at time zero of a claim on the greater of p(t) 
— c and zero. 
Since c is known and nonstochastic,  this is the same as the value of an option to pay c at 
time t for an asset whose price is p(t). If  p—c> Oat t, the owner of the option exercises it, 
paying c and getting an asset worth p. If p  — c < 0 at t, the option is "out of the money", 
and the owner does nothing; the option is worthless.  This is the description of a European 
call option; a method for finding its value  and a proof of W(.,  ., .)' differentiability  is 
developed in Merton [19761.17 In the full refunds case, for example, the firm "owns a call 
option on .5r of net income if p > c, and the government  "owns" a similar call on .5r of 
— c if  > 
The explicit value of this claim is'9 
W(p,t,c) = estpo(dj) 
— e_tc(d2)  (12) 
where 
LI  For an introduction to optLons  and their use in investment analysis, see Mason and Merton  [1986J.  '  Majd and Myers  [t984]  also view tax liabii.ites on stachastic income as contingent claims similar to 
financial options contracts.  '  This formula can be calculated directly by realizing that p is distributed lognormally, and evaluating 
the integral  expression for the expectation. 
13 ln[po/c + [r 
— s + 4]t  d1= 
d2 = d1  — 
We can now write an explicit formulation for the value of an existing, open mine under 
either of the two corporate tax loss rules: 
PT 







— c(d2))ledt  ((13)) 
MN(p,t) = f {(POe5t_c)et_.5r[(POe(dl) 
— c(dZ))+(poeat(l)  c(2))] }dt 
(14) 
where j3 =  and d is equal to d defined above, with  = 3p substituted for p  T is 
the number of years required to mine the known reserves at the constant rate  per year. 
In the case of  full refunds, the firm pays a base corporate  tax rate of r, whether net income 
is positive or negative.  Then, if net income is positive, the firm gets back a contingent 
claim equal to half of its tax liability, but the government takes a "cream-skimming" claim 
equal to the difference between 50% of net income and 8% of  gross revenues if price is high 
enough, p> c//3. 
When  there are no  loss  refunds,  the firm gets to  keep  its net income,  less  the base 
corporate tax claim of .5r times  positive net income,  and less the government's "cream- 
skimming"  claim if p> c//3. 
Having found an explicit solution to the  value of the stochastic and dynamic cash flows 
of a mine, we can investigate  the effects of the tax policies on mine value, and observe how 
tax policy interacts with uncertainty. 
14 Effect of Tax Policy Changes on Asset Value 
Consider first the corporate tax with full loss refunds. 
Result 1.  If the expected discounted pre-tax profits of the mine are positive (negative), 
then  an increase  in the (symmetric) corporate tax rate will lower (raise) the value of the 
mine. 
Proof. Differentiating  (13) with respect to r and rearranging, 
dMF = 
1T  { 
—(p0et 
— cert)q + .5q [W(p, t, c)  W(,  t, c)] }dt  (15) 
Period-by-period,  the integrand must  be negative if expected  period  profits,  (p0e— 
— 
are positive, and conversely.20  The result follows by taking the integral over the 
life of the mine.1 
The result is fairly intuitive. Equation  (15) shows that the effect of a corporate  tax rate 
increase is to raise the magnitude of ordinary tax payments  (the first term), and also to 
raise the value of the PDA subsidy to the firm (the second term). Since the PDA subsidy 
in a given year can never be larger than the a fraction  (50%)  of the ordinary  tax liability, 
the first effect dominates.  An increase in the tax rate will  only  benefit mines which are 
expected to lose money, since loss refunds will provide a net subsidy to the firm, and the 
subsidy  will increase. 
It is straightforward  to show that an increase in the corporate tax rate always decreases 
the value of a mine when there are no loss refunds. In this case, the ordinary  tax payments 
increase,  and the value of the PDA subsidy increases, but by a proportionately  smaller 
amount.  Since only positive taxes are ever paid, the net effect  must  be to reduce  the 
discounted present value of cash flows,  and mine value decreases. 
Similarly, we can  calculate the comparative  static for mine value  as  the PDA rate 
changes. 
20  This is true because the upper limit on W(p, t,  c) is equal to expected period profits, and the lower limit 
on W(, i,  c) is zero so the difference  can never be as great as twice expected profits. By examination, 
the difference is always positive. 
15 Result 2.  The value of  a mine is strictly increasing in the percentage depletion  allowance 
rate. 
Proof.  For the case with full loss refunds, 
j]I4F  [TaW(ftt)  (16  dS 
— 
Jo  35 
Since  = (')p,  the sign on the partial derivative in the integrand  is the opposite of 
the sign of  The value of a European call is increasing in the price of the underlying 
asset;21 the result follows directly.I 
The intuition for this result can  he easily seen by looking  at Figure (1).  Increasing 
the PDA rate raises the critical value, p", and lowers the slope of the "cream-skimming" 
region.  Thus, tax liabilities will be weakly  lower  in all states of the world,  and strictly 
lower when price is high enough.  The government's  "cream-skimming" is reduced,  making 
the tax liability function  less convex; loosely speaking, reducing  the convexity of a function 
decreases its expected  value. 
The same result is easily  derived for the case of no loss refunds, since the PDA subsidy 
is only operative when net income is positive.22 
Another way to see the role of uncertainty  when evaluating  the FDA is to consider 
the difference between the equilibrium (market) value of the subsidy and the value of the 
subsidy  given an  expected price forecast.  A naive evaluation of  the tax policy might  use the 
latter approach, first forecasting an expected price path, and then, given expected output 
prices,  calculate the value of the subsidy.  These are the type of  calculations prepared 
by the U.S. Treasury  Department.23  However, since the FDA is a nonlinear function of 
stochastic revenues, this approach violates Jensen's Inequality. 
21  See,  e.g. Black  and Scholes  [1973]. 
22  That the PDA always increases asset value depends importantly  on the details of the tax code.  If the 
law required firms to deduct tax-loss carryforwards from taxable income before  the PDA's 50%  of net 
income limitation ie calculated, then the value  of marginal mince—those whose aeeet value is nearly 
serb  without a PDA—will be  decreased by the PDA. Since this change generally lowers the tax rate 
on Ion refunds to  Sc, this PDA rule essentially lowers a nondietortionary cash-flow tax on gains and 
losses to  Sc, while  giving the government a cream-skimming  contingent claim. Lowering the cash-flow 
tax rate has little effect  on marginal asset values,  but adding the cream-skmming claim lowers asset 
values.  This case is worked out in greater detail in MacKie-Mason [1984a[. 
23  See,  e.g., Clark [1985[. 
16 It is easy to see that the value of the FDA subsidy  to firms is actually less than the 
value calculated  by the erroneous  method.  This can be seen in Figure (i). Since the FDA 
convexifies the government's  tax claim on stochastic revenues, the following relationship 
can be shown: 
E[TAX(p)]> TAX(E[pj)  (17) 
The government gets the "cream-skimming" claim when a mine pays off well, but doesn't 
give anything extra back to the firm when revenues are  low. 
We now summarize  the effects of the FDA on asset value.  The realized value of the 
subsidy is  greater  as  the quasi-rents  on a project  are greater; i.e., the subsidy increases 
with realized net income.  The subsidy has the smallest effect on the asset value of projects 
which are marginal.  In this sense,  it can be said  that the FDA is primarily a windfall 
subsidy to inframarginal  projects.  Further,  the economic value of the subsidy is less than 
calculations which ignore uncertainty suggest, because  if prices fortuitously increase,  the 
government skims the cream  off the project. 
The  Effect of Risk on the FDA Subsidy 
In recent years, the FDA subsidy has been justified  as a mechanism for compensating 
firms for the riskiness of mining, and for providing incentives for investment  in mining.24 
Although  there are many different sources and types of risk  associated with mining  in- 
vestments, one of the most important is price risk.25 We will consider here how increases 
in price risk affect the value of the FDA subsidy; in Section 4 we investigate the effect of 
increasing risk on optimal investment  decisions. 
Whether losses are fully refunded or not, we obtain the following result: 
Result 3.  if  project value is non-increasing  in price risk  without  the FDA, then for suffi- 
ciently profitable  projects (i.e., P0 
— c large enough),  the FDA subsidy decreases  as price 
risk increases. 
By the FDA subsidy, we mean the equilibrium value of the difference between future taxes 
paid with and without a FDA. We will discuss "sufficiently profitable"  below. 
24  See footnote 1. 
25  Bodie  and Rosaneky [1980] report  annual standard  deviations in futures prices for several minerals of 
25—50%. 
17 Proof. (For full tax loss refunds.) Differentiating  the function giving a mine's value,  (13), 
by the instantaneous  variance of the price process yields2° 
3M"(p,t) =  3M"° + .flrcfTe_,  {(d2) 
— 
(d2)] dt  (18) 
where: 
1 — r +  .5r1'(T) 
1—r 






and M"0 indicates the value of the mine without a PDA. (The derivation  is straightfor- 
ward, but tedious; see MacKie.-Mason j1984J.) 
Since d1 > d,  < 1 and (.) is  bounded above by unity, we have 0 C  IT(T)  < 
Thus, -y  > 1,  and the first term of  (18)  is a multiplier on the aversion to risk without a 
PDA. Since 1) is the gaussian pdf, for Po > c sufficiently, the second expression in (18) is 
also negative,  and the decline in value of the mine is greater with a PDA than without.  I 
With full loss refunds, the firm pays the ordinary  income tax, but receives in return the 
difference between two contingent  claims (see equation  (13) and Figure 1).  By assumption, 
the value  of the ordinary  tax claim is not  decreasing in risk  (the firm  is not price-risk 
loving).  The convexity of the claims causes their value (to the firm and the government, 
respectively)  to increase in risk. 
If the initial margin, (P0 
— c), is low, then increased risk increases the probability  of a 
project obtaining the FDA at all, since there is no subsidy  if net income is negative.  In 
this case, the increase in the value of the firm's contingent claim dominates,  and the PDA 
subsidy  may be increasing in risk (i.e., if the second term in (18) is big enough to dominate 
the multiplier,  -y). 
Although Rothschild and Stiglits  (1970j  show that in general variance is not a sufficient proxy for 
riskiness, Merton [1973a] has shown that when the stochastic process is Ito, the instantaneous variaoce 
is consistent with the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition. 
27  We have been  assuming that investment  opportunities are constant through time,  so  that  &  aod r 
(hence s) are constants over time. If the signs on j.&3r could change over time, then r < 0 is possible. 
However,  the requirement that  4° C 0 imposes restrictions on  that make this unlikely. 
18 However, if the margin is higher, then an increase in risk primarily  increases the proba- 
bilitiy of  government  "cream-skimming"; i.e., the increase in the value of the government's 
contingent claim dominates. Then, the PDA subsidy  decreases with price risk, because 
-y > 1  and the second term is negative. 
So far, we have only considered mines which are already  open and operating, and have 
assumed that the mine will continue operating  until exhausted,  regardless of profitability. 
Suppose  mine  operators have an option to temporarily  shut down, or permanently  abandon 
a mine if prices fall too far. Then, we can expect a selection process which results in the 
portfolio of prnductive mines being weighted towards  those with higher margins, ceteris 
paribus.  In fact, in numerical  simulations in which project value is nonincreasing in risk, we 
find that when a mine has sufficiently high expected profits to remain open and operating, 
the value of the PDA subsidy declines in price risk.  This gives some content to the phrase, 
"sufficiently profitable": in our calculations, the value of the PDA was decreasing in price 
risk for any mines sufficiently profitable to be open. 
RISKY INVESTMENT IEC1SIONS 
In this section, we show how the methods described can be extended to the analysis  of 
optimal  risky investment  decisions. We then investigate, both analytically and numerically, 
the effect of a corporate income tax and a percentage  depletion  allowance on risky mining 
investment  decisions. In the numerical examples, we also generalize the description of the 
operating options available to a mining firm, to increase the realism of the model. 
Discussion  of the Investment  Decision 
Consider  a firm which owns the right to exploit the mineral resources in a particular 
property, and that it costs I to put this property into production.  We call the value  of 
this (lease) right L(p,I,t,T), where T is the date on which the right expires.  That is, at 
a price I the firm can buy a producing  mine, worth M(p,R,t;t4),  with R total reserves, 
and operating policy options •28  We  continue to assume that reserves are known  and 
fixed, so we suppress the argument, R; we also assume for simplicity that the right never 
expires, so T is infinite. 
28  Thie  approach to modeling the inveetrnent in a mine haa alao been adopted by Brennan and  SchwartE 
[1986]. 
19 For our problem, it is easy to show that there must  be some critical initial resource 
price, p, above which it is optimal  for the firm to invest immediately, and below which it 
is preferable  to wait in anticipation of higher prices. Market equilibrium  will require that 
L(p*,t) = Jt4(p* 
— I  (19) 
Since the firm is free to optimally  choose the price at which it will invest, we also know 
that the following marginal  condition is necessary (see Merton 11973a1): 
L(p,t) = Mp(p,t;t,b)  (20) 
The fundamental  valuation result from Section 2 requires that L also satisfy the following 
ordinary differential equation (for a lease right that never expires): 
a2p2Lpp  +  — rL = 0 




where a and pt are determined  by the necessary conditions  (19)  and (20). 
Before we present  the results of some numerical simulations, we again  consider our 
simple analytical  example of a mine  which, once open, continues producing until all reserves 
are exhausted. We substitute (Li) into (19) and (20), solve (20)  for a, and substitute into 
(19), arriving at (for the full loss offsets case) 
b  1 
0 = A = —fl /  {(i 
— r) + .5r[4'(di) _fl4(d1)]}etdt  b  Jo 
rT 
— q /  {(1 
— r) + .5r{(d2) 
— (d2)]}e'1dt  ((22)) 
Jo 
20 To find the effect of various tax parameters on the optimal investment  decision, we 
apply the Implicit  Function Theorem  to differentiate  (22).  The resulting expressions are 
complicated  so we discuss some of the results without presenting the calculations. 
The optimal investment  price is  determined on the basis of two values.  First, paying 
the investment  price buys the firm a producing  mine, which has an asset value.  If the 
value of a producing  mine, M, is greater than the investment  cost,  I, the investment  is 
potentially desirable. 
At the same time, the output price of the project is stochasticaliy changing; typically 
we assume  an upward  drift  in price, consistent  with a stochastic  Hotelling equilibrium, 
such as  that derived in Pindyck [19801. There is some probability  that a producing mine 
will be worth more if production  commences tomorrow instead of today;  thus there  is  a 
value  to waiting,  or speculating  against  an abnormally  high increase in the production 
value.  The optimal  investment  price balances the returns to waiting against the profit 
available from commencing production  immediately.  For example,  if the current price is 
Pt  < p, then the value of the lease right is maximized by waiting for price to increase to 
at least p before investing in production  facilities.2 
The effects of tax policy on the optimal investment  decision are most easily inter- 
preted by describing  their impact  on the value of waiting  and the current profitability 
of production. By implicitly differentiating  (22), the following surprising results can be 
demonstrated: 
Result 4.  Increasing the rate of  corporate income taxation, r, can encourage  investment, 
by lowering the optimal critical investment price, p. 
Result 5.  Increasing  the rate of the percentage depletion deduction,  5,  can discourage 
investment. 
To describe the first result — that increasing the corporate tax rate may encourage in- 
vestment — consider a mineral for which the expected rate of (risk-adju d) price growth, 
20  Waiting can be optimal, for example, in an industry equilibrium with low-cost and high-cost imnes. 
The low  coot mines will be developed first, and the high-cost projects later. 
21 Er  is relatively high compared to the risk-free return, r.30  When the rate of price growth 
is high, the return to waiting  is  relatively high, and the optimal investment  price will be 
substantially above the minimal price required  to break even on immediate production. 
An increase in the corporate  tax rate decreases  the expected compensation  for the risk 
associated with waiting, and the firm is not willing to wait as long before investing in a 
profitable  project.3' Thus, even though the value of both the lease right and a producing 
mine fall as the corporate tax rate increases, investment may be encouraged because the 
value of production  now has risen relative to the value of waiting to produce in the future. 
The second result is illustrated by a different case. Suppose that the risk-adjusted  rate 
of price growth  is  relatively low, and the riskiness of price (a2)  is also  low.  It is then 
possible that an increase in the PDA will actually discourage investment,  by raising  the 
critical investment price which leads firms to delay production. 
When  &  is low, there is not much gain from waiting to invest; discounting  erodes most 
of the return. In such a case, the optimal  investment price will be quite close to the minimal 
price required to yield an expected profit equal to the required return on the investment 
cost. 
Consider Figure 3.  When the FDA is increased, the kink in the tax function  is moved 
outward (the higher S means that the 50%  of net income limitation becomes binding at 
higher prices). In Figure 3,  the old  optimal  investment  price now falls below the kink. 
With the higher PDA, if the firm waits to invest, its expected marginal tax rate on higher 
prices will be substantially  lower than with the lower  PDA, and the expected return to 
waiting  is correspondingly higher.  At the low optimal investment price, the firm will not 
make much profit from immediate production, so little is lost by waiting longer to invest 
to take advantage  of the lower tax rate on higher expected future prices. 
The interaction  between un...ertainty and the  nonlinearity of the tax  system is important 
in these cases. For instance, in the second example, if price risk is not low, then although 
° That is, the "convenience  yield" on the mineral (p = r —  a)—the  equilibrium return  to holding the 
mineral  now, rather than a futures  contract for the mineral — is relatively low,  so that most of the 
equilibrium retum to owning the mineral asset is from market price growth. 
The immediate profitability of investment is of course also diminished, hut when the value to waiting 
is high,  profits—quasi-rents—are  relatively high at the optimal investment price, and are still high 
enough to justify investment even after the tax increase and the lowering of the critical price. 
22 TAX 
it is more likely that the firm will get higher future  PDA deductions,  it also is more likely 
that the project will end up earning losses. The result is that the increased value of waiting 
from a higher PDA is discounted  at a higher rate due to the uncertainty of obtaining the 
benefits of the lower tax liabilities, and the increase in the value of immediate  production 
may now dominate, leading to greater investment, rather than lower investment. 
Nurner;ta!  Stmulation.s 
Evaluating risky investment  decisions is a complicated  problem,  especially when taxes 
introduce nonlinearities  into cash flows,  and when the project is long-lived, with dynamic 
uncertainty. It will generally be extremely difficult to analytically evaluate the effects of 
different tax  policies, or operating options.  The analyses presented above were only feasible 
because  we made severe simplifications  in the specification of the mining  project and the 
investment decision. 
When more complex conditions  are incorporated  in the problem, the valuation method 
described  in this paper can be applied  numerically.  The general method requires the solu- 
tion to the stochastic  Bellman  partial differential equation, as in (5), subject to appropriate 
boundary conditions. The Bellman equation falls into the class of parabolic partial  dif- 
23 
(p-c)q 
Figure 3.  An Increase in the PDA can  Discourage Investment ferential  equations; numerical  solution  methods  are well-developed  for problems  in two 
and even three dimensions.  Similar  problems are quite regularly  solved in finance applica- 
tions; see, e.g., Geske and Shastri [1985], and Mason [1979] for presentations  of numerical 
methods. 
There  will be situations in which  even the numerical solution  of the Bellman equation 
will be infeasible.  For instance, if we were to correctly model corporate income tax loss 
carryforwards,  one of the stochastic state variables on which asset value depended would 
be the carryforward. In general, it will not be possible to specify a terminal boundary for 
this state variable;  a known terminal boundary  is  necessary for the backwards  recursion 
solution methods usually  applied.  However, a Monte Carlo approach may  be feasible in 
some such problems.  The Monte  Carlo method uses  a forward solution, simulating  the 
sample paths of the stochastic  state variables, and valuing the asset over a large sample 
of such simulations.  This approach is possible because of the  "expected value equivalent" 
approach outlined in Section  2 above.32 
We present some results of numerical evaluations in order to demonstrate  the feasibility 
of the valuation method for certain types of problem.  We consider an investment in an oil 
field. Assumptions about production, costs, and rates of return  are based on Lund's  [1987] 
analysis of typical North Sea oil fields.33  The main assumptions  are presented  in Table 1. 
Although  we assume that field output is fixed if producing,  we allow the firm to tem- 
porarily halt production if prices fall sufficiently, and to restart production if prices rise. 
Shutdown  and reopening  have  a  fixed  cost; in addition, maintaining a field during  the 
dormant period also has a (flow)  cost.  The firm can abandon a field altogether at zero 
cost, but abandoned  fields are never worth  reopening. 
We present some representative  results in Tables 2, 3 and 4; Table 2 assumes that loss 
offsets are immediate,  and Table 3  that tax losses are never refunded.  Table 4 presents 
Lund  [1987] uses a Monte Carlo  method to value different Norwegian tax policies on offshore oil 
development. 
33  Although these assumptions may not be particularly representative of U.S. production fields, Lmd's 
numbers are carefully derived and calibrated. They suffice for the illustrative purposes of our simula- 
tions. The valuations can be determined when costs and output are known but changing over time, as 
in Lund [1987], but the qualitative results are unaffected by this additional complication. The invest- 
ment cost is only $500 million instead of $700 million in Lund's paper, because the optimal investment 
price was implausibly high for $700 MM. This is not surprising, since we assume that lease rights last 
forever, when in fact they typically expire after a few  years, thus lowering the relum to waiting. 
24 the value of the PDA subsidy for a few cases with full loss offsets.  We consider several 
different combinations  of the depletion  allowance rate, the riskiness of the output price 
path, and the convenience yield on oil.34 
The numerical calculations reinforce the earlier results.  Consider Table 2 (symmetric 
taxation). The prices p  are the minimal prices required for initial investment  in the field 
to be optimal.  For all three combinations  of risk and convenience yield presented, the 
minimal investment  price decreases as the FDA rate increases; the FDA encourages large 
investments. 
On the other hand, at lower prices, when current production  is marginally profitable, 
the FDA can discourage productive  investments.  For example, in most cases an increase in 
the FDA leads to a higher required price before it is optimal  to make the fixed cost invest- 
ment in reopening a closed  field.  Similarly, increases in the PDA increase the likelihood 
that firms will "disinvest", by temporarily halting production of operating fields. 
Table 4 demonstrates  that the FDA provides substantial inframarginal rents, even  while 
encouraging investment at the margin. The FDA subsidy (for 5 = 22%) when output price 
is $30 per barrel is $538 million for a field with "low costs."  The subsidy at a price of 
$3.53 per barrel, essentially equal to marginal  cost, is only $36 million for a low-cost mine. 
Viewed another way, the subsidy at $30/bbl for a "high-cost"  field  (say, a  "deep oil", a 
tertiary-recovery,  or a "heavy oil"  field) is only $276 million; about half the subsidy  to a 
low-cost, inframarginal  project. 
Conclusion 
We have shown how  to use a stochastic model of intertemporal asset valuation to 
analyze the effects of tax policies on both asset values and risky investment decisions. In the 
continuons  time framework  employed, it is relatively straightforward  to model nonlinear 
or asymmetric tax policies of a sort often encountered;  viz.,  taxes involving  kinks,  or 
contingent marginal tax rates. 
Analysis of the effects of a corporate  income tax with a percentage  depletion  allowance 
on the value of mines and decisions to invest in mines provided some interesting results. 
The convenience  yield is p in our earlier notation, which determines the risk-adjusted rate of expected 
price growth, & = r — p. 
25 These  taxes have the expected  effects on asset values, but the distortion  to investment 
decisions can be surprising. The risky investment decision involves a trade-off  between the 
current expected  profitability  of a mine, and the expected return from waiting until output 
prices are higher.  It is possible that an increase in the corporate tax rate will encourage 
investment,  by reducing the value of waiting to invest relatively more than the reduction 
in immediate  profitability.  Similarly, an increase in the PDA subsidy  may  discourage 
investment,  by increasing the relative return to waiting. 
The importance  of interactions  between uncertainty  and nonlinear taxes was also illus- 
trated by observing that a calculation of the FDA subsidy to a project which  ignores these 
interactions  will overestimate the value of the subsidy. 
Numerical examples were calculated to illustrate the feasibility of the method for rela- 
tively complicated  dynamic investment  and management problems.  The numerical exam- 
ples emphasized  the comparative static results by presenting cases in which large,  initial 
production investments  in  a property would be encouraged  by the FDA,  but smaller, 
"operating"  investments would be discouraged (i.e, shutdown would be encouraged,  and 
re-opening a closed mine would be discouraged). 
All of the analysis in this paper has been of partial equilibrium effects;  in particular, 
the exogenous stochastic  price path was unaffected by tax changes.  Such an analysis  is 
appropriate for the tax policies of a country  in which production  of the mineral  is small 
relative  to  world output. In a Hotelling-type stochastic general equilibrium model,  MacKie- 
Mason [1984b]  has found that a PDA offered to all firms in an industry tends to increase 
exploration  efforts, but also to lower output prices and increase consumption rates.  The 
effect on total ultimate recovery is ambiguous; in general, the PDA may or may not be a 
conservationist  policy.35 
Two other recent papers ar. concerned with valuing mining assets and investment  deci- 
sions. Brennan and Schwartz [1986] apply a valuation method derived from a no-arbitrage 
condition in securities markets.  Their approach requires  that futures  contracts for the 
commodity  be traded with maturities spanning the time horizon of the investment.  Since 
This model involved  somewhat different cost and geological  assumptions  so the results are not directly 
comparable to those in the present paper. 
26 minerals futures are generally oniy traded with maturities of one year or less, applications 
require restrictive  assumptions  quite similar to those of the asset pricing equilibrium  ap- 
proach employed in this paper.  Brennan and Schwartz [1986] illustrate how to incorporate 
some taxes  in the analysis,  but do not  investigate  the effect of any tax policies on asset 
values or investment and operating decisions. 
Lund  [1987] uses Monte Carlo techniques to solve a contingent valuation problem for 
investments  in North Sea oil fields.  his  analysis emphasizes  the effects of the existing 
Norwegian tax  system on the scale of  development for an already  discovered held.  He does 
not consider the effects of changing tax policies. 
Considerable  interest has arisen in the application of models of intertemporal asset 
pricing,  as developed in finance literature,  to problems of "real" investment.  This paper has 
taken such an approach to the analysis of tax policy effects on asset values and investment 
and operating  decisions, demonstrating  both the analytical  and numerical tractability of 
the method for at least some problems.  The interesting new results on tax effects show 
promise for the use of the methods to study other economic problems. 
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29 TABLE  I 
Assumptions  for Numerical  Valuation!  of Oil Field 
Costs 
Annual maintenance  if closed:  $5 million 
Unit cost of production:  $3.51/bbl 
Coat of opening or closing existing  field:  $1 million 
Initial investment  cost:  $500 million 
Taxes 
Corporate income tax rate:  50% 
Percentage depletion  allowance rate:  varies 
Tax treatment of losses:  varies 
Prices and Production 
Real interest rate:  3% 
Convenience yield (,z = r — &):  varies 
Instantaneous price variance:  varies 
Maximum  reserves:  226.1 million bbl 
Maximum annual  extraction rate:  13.3 million bbl 
TABLE  2 
Asset Values and Investment  Decisions: Full Loss  Offsets 
______-_______________ (Field Valties  in Million £) 
PDA Rate  (6)  p  V0(p)  p  'Vo(p)  —  V0(p) 
Case  1: 2  = .0685, e  =  .04 
0%  21.46  1460.6  3.83  70.2  2.62  13.4 
15%  18.92  1482.8  4.00  107.5  2.98  39.8 
22%  17.39  1435.6  4.17  130.5  3.11  52.5 
Case 2 tr = .137, s = .04 
0%  30.02  2179.7  4.73  158.5  3.24  68.1 
15%  26.47  2210.9  4.54  186.4  3.24  91.1 
22%  24.34  2146.0  4.73  218.4  3.38  109.4 
Case  3: y2 = .137, s = .08 
0%  24.34  1225.2  3.68  42.3  2.22  2.5 
15%  21.46  1241.5  3.83  64.4 2.63  15.7 
22%  20.57  1263.2  3.83  70.0 2.63  17.6 
Notes: (p  p,  p)  are prices at  which  it is optimal to make  the initial investment in 
the  field, re-open a dosed but developed  field,  or dose an  operating  field, respectively. V0(.) 
is the value of a  developed  field if  open  (operating); V() is the value of a  developed 
field which is not  producing (ahuidown). TABLE 3 
Asset Values and Investment Decisions:  No Lou Offsets 
(FIdd Values in Milhin £) 
P 
Case .1: 
DA Rate (6) 
(72 = .0685, z = .04 
p  V0(p)  p  V(p)  p  V0(p") 
0%  21.46  1460.3  4.00  78.3  3.11  30.4 
15%  18.92  1482.8  4,17  119.1  3.38  62.4 
22%  17.39  1435.4  4.17  129.7  3.24  59.5 
Case 2  = .137,  = .04 
0%  30.02  2179.4  4.73  158.0  3.38  75.0 
15%  26.47  2210.5  4.73  201.1  3.53  109.6 
22%  24.34  2145.7  4.73  218.2  3.53  110.1 
Notes: See Table 2 
TABLE 4 
Value of the PDA Subsidy (million $) 
PDA Subsidy  Value (6 = 22% vs. 5 = 0%) 
"Low Cost" Field (c = $3.51/bbl) 
P0 = $30/bbl  538.3 
P0 = $3.53/bbl  36.6 
"High Cost" Field  (c = $25/bbl) 
P0 = $30/bbl  275.6 
Notes:  These valuaiions assume  2 = .1369 and  z = .04. 